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SUSTAINING ESD IN AUSTRALIA
HELEN ENDRE-STACY*
INTRODUCTION
The still slippery concept of sustainable development continues as
the contemporary resource use paradigm. Non-equilibrium ecology
will be an important component of sustainable development discourse
because it recognizes, for better or worse, the role of humans in the
evolution of dynamic ecosystems. However, the experience in Austra-
lia with the use of sustainable development supported by ecology sug-
gests that these ideas are limited by their emphasis on the fixed
discourse(s) of expertise and exclude valuable sources of information.
Sustainable development discourse oscillates between economics and
ethics as competing, rather than complementary, principles. Both
concepts rest on Enlightenment values of rationality and predictabil-
ity. Efforts to move beyond this dualism remain within that linguistic
code and thus the concept remains trapped by its own (self-imposed)
boundaries. To enliven itself, sustainable development must incorpo-
rate revitalised ideas of community and precaution. Redrawn, these
may be viewed as parallel concepts. Much valuable information about
environmental consequences lies outside the discourses of scientific,
economic, and legal expertise and can be found with community
stakeholder activities. Decision-making needs to include the local sys-
tems and it needs to look to precaution as a way of avoiding the clo-
sure of local systems of information. For development to be
sustainable, it needs to work from a legal system that is nested in flexi-
bility rather than constancy. Natural and social systems are not static,
and the law needs to recognize more fully the contingency of all
knowledge and information and it needs to take on ecology's comfort
with heterogeneity.
The concept of ecologically sustainable development ("ESD")
became part of the vocabulary of international environmental aspira-
tions in the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natu-
* Lecturer in Law, Faculty of Law, Queensland University of Technology (QUT) Bris-
bane, Australia; Barrister and Solicitor, South Australia; Solicitor, New South Wales; Barrister,
Queensland; Barrister, Inner Temple, England and Wales. My thanks go to Charles Sampford
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ral Resources' ("IUCN") 1980 World Conservation Strategy.1 The
blueprint for a global strategy of survival contained in the United Na-
tion's publication of the report of the World Commission on Environ-
ment and Development, Our Common Future ("Brundtland
Report"), of 1987 set out an agenda for common international action
premised upon the idea of sustainable development. 2 It went much
further than the 1972 Stockholm Conference of the United Nations in
its aspirational declaration of equity of economic development be-
tween rich and poor nations through international cooperation. It
stated that the future is imperiled without combined international ef-
fort and shared principles to guide national action.3 The Brundtland
Report is one of many accounts that clearly showed that negative en-
vironmental impacts are being experienced globally-in market and
planned economies, in industrialised and developing countries, and in
urban and rural settings. The Brundtland Report's focus upon ecolog-
ically sustainable development put ESD on the policy table in a big
way. ESD rests upon balancing environmental and ecological require-
ments and economic development; 4 it is premised upon international
and national institutional cooperation to ensure that the economic
needs of the present are met without sacrificing or compromising the
economic needs of future generations.
Whilst scientific evidence on the consequences of environmental
degradation seems, if anything, to become increasingly inconclusive, it
is also becoming clearer that "zero-infinity dilemmas," whereby some
threshold of ecological tolerance level is reached and the environmen-
tal outcome is negative and irreversible, will continue to place legal
environmental approaches on contemporary political and legal agen-
das. The Brundtland Report proposed that economic development in
the near term must not threaten ecological well-being in the long
term. ESD has sought to seal the intellectual chasm between the
developmentalist and the environmentalist. Each country is left,
probably quite properly in relation to issues that are more local than
1. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE & NATURAL RESOURCES ET
AL., WORLD CONSERVATION STRATEGY: LIVING RESOURCE CONSERVATION FOR SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT (1980).
2. WORLD COMM'N ON ENV'T & DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE 8-9 (1987) [here-
inafter Brundtland Report].
3. Id.
4. The Brundtland Report defined ESD as a process of change in which "the exploitation
of resources, the direction of investments, the orientation of technological development, and
institutional change are all in harmony and enhance both current and future potential to meet
human needs and aspirations." Id. at 46.
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global, to construct an appropriate policy and legislative response to
the Brundtland Report's call for ESD.
New perspectives on ecology are offering different perspectives
on interactions in the natural world. The same phenomena are
viewed, but suggest a different observation-from predation to coop-
eration,5 from parasitism to mutualism, and from competition to reci-
procity.6 This understates the adversariness of nature (Charles
Darwin) and economics (Adam Smith)7 that influence our political
and legal institutions and suggests a move to a new paradigm that ac-
tively searches to include cooperation. "Prudent predation" may offer
itself as a metaphor for sustainable multiple use of resources. 8 Atten-
tion to multiple meanings helps to prevent ESD from becoming a
fixed and authoritarian ideal. On the other hand, without ideals that
become standards, law is flabby and cannot assist in approaches to
resource use that are more sustainable. ESD was defined in the
Brundtland Report as "development that meets the needs of the pres-
ent without compromising the ability of future generations to meet
their own needs."9 This definition was rephrased in the IUCN's 1990
paper, Caring for the World, as "improving the capacity to convert a
constant level of physical resource use to the increased satisfaction of
human needs." 10 In 1988, the Australian federal government adopted
ESD in three environmental principles that are to guide its policy and
legislation:
* there should be an integrated approach to conservation and de-
velopment by taking both conservation and developments into ac-
count at an early stage;
5. The Prisoners' Dilemma game illustrates that cooperation increases with increasing
chances of re-meeting opponents. This can be juxtaposed to an existential Satre-like "no exit"
situation where the choices are survival or extinction. If extinction represents a type of "losing,"
then the only point in the evolution game is existence.
6. One of the elements of dialogic reciprocity suggested by Handler in his self-regulatory
model is repeated contact amongst individuals. See Joel F. Handler, Dependent People, the
State, and the Modern/Postmodern Search for the Dialogic Community, 35 UCLA L. REv. 999
(1988).
7. The links between Adam Smith's "invisible hand of the market" and Charles Darwin's
"survival of the fittest" are not surprising. Both views were framed within the same teleological
view of linear logic and atomistic individualism.
8. Odum suggests that:
The widespread acceptance of Darwin's 'survival of the fittest' as an important means
of bringing about natural selection has directed attention to the competitive aspects of
nature. As a result, the importance of cooperation between species in nature has been
underestimated. Until recently, positive interactions have not been subjected to as
much quantitative study as have negative interactions.
EUGENE P. ODUM, BASIC ECOLOGY 393 (1983).
9. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at 43.
10. INTERNATIONAL UNION FOR CONSERVATION OF NATURE AND NATURAL RESOURCES
ET AL., CARING FOR THE WORLD: A STRATEGY FOR SUSTAINABILITY 10 (Second Draft 1990).
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0 resource use decisions should seek to optimise the net benefits
to the community from the nation's resources having regard to the
efficiency of the resource use, environmental considerations and an
equitable distribution on the return of the resources; and
* Commonwealth decisions, policies and management regimes
may provide for additional uses that are compatible with the pri-
mary purpose values of the area, recognising that in some cases
both conservation and development interests can be accommodated
concurrently or sequentially, and, in other cases, choices must be
made between alternative uses or combinations of uses. 11
ESD has been pursued by Australia's federal government in three
primary areas: (i) through the Resource Assessment Commission
("Commission"); (ii) through the federal ESD process; and (iii)
through the Landcare Program. The first two are discussed here in
more detail. 12 Each of them has the potential to incorporate ecology's
new insights. At the practical level, this suggests a broader examina-
tion of ecological processes. At the theoretical level, it suggests that
the critique of policy and legal approaches to ESD must continue.
I. AUSTRALIA'S COMMISSION 1989-1993
The Australian federal government's environment principles
were included in slightly modified form in the legislation that estab-
lished the Commission in 1989 as a cross-disciplinary body to advise
the federal government on specific resource issues.13 The Commission
11. THE HONORABLE R.J.L. HAWKE, A.C. PRIME MINISTER OF AUSTRALIA, OUR COUN-
TRY OUR FUTURE: STATEMENT ON THE ENVIRONMENT 5 (1989). In setting out broad environ-
mental principles. Australia lagged well behind European responses to dwindling resources. For
instance, the Federal Republic of Germany formulated its first environmental principles in 1971.
The Environmental Program of the 1971 federal executive laid down three environmental princi-
ples that were to guide future policy and legislative instruments. These are: (i) the principle of
precaution that not only requires environmental regulations to deal with present environmental
problems; but they must also take into account the extent of environmental risk posed by an
action (in assessing the risk, the principle has been used to require screening of new products
prior to sale and consideration of environmental concerns in planning); (ii) the polluter-pays
principle that seeks to pass on the costs of pollution to those who use the product that caused the
pollution via market mechanisms and cost internalisation; and (iii) the cooperation principle,
premised on the assumption that environmental problems are best resolved by agreement and
broad commitment to environmental usage that is collectively advantageous, rather than by co-
ercion and confrontation. These principles have been incorporated in the Treaty Establishing a
Monetary, Economic and Social Union, May 18, 1990, F.R.G. - G.D.R., 29 I.L.M. 1120.
12. For a description of the National Landcare Program, see ANDREW CAMPBELL, TAKING
THE LONG VIEW IN TOUGH TIMES: LANDCARE IN AUSTRALIA (1992). There are now approxi-
mately 1,400 landcare groups around (mostly rural) Australia. The program depends on commu-
nity participation for its success.
13. Resource Assessment Commission Act 1989, No. 94, Austl. Acts (1989). Schedule 1
containing the Policy Principles for Resolving Competing Claims for the Use of Resources are an
amended version of the 1988 federal Environmental Principles. The amended Principles read as
follows (modifications are italicised):
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issued three reports before being dismantled in 1993.14 Surprisingly,
the 1993 federal government budget announced that the Commission
would close down at the end of that year. It was a budget of fiscal
restraint and the Commission's dissolution was included in a new
round of federal government stringencies. Whilst the Commission's
dissolution does not mean that resource development will no longer
be scrutinised, it does mean that the federal Environment Protection
(Impact of Proposals) Act of 1974 will again become the primary
method of scrutiny of resource proposals. 15
The processes of the Commission aptly demonstrate an institu-
tional struggle with individualism and collective concern and effi-
ciency. The second Reference to the Commission 16 was an inquiry
into the merits of mineral ore mining at Coronation Hill in the
Kakadu National Park in the Northern Territory ("Kakadu In-
1. There should be an integrated approach to conservation (including all environ-
mental and ecological considerations) and development by taking both conservation
(including all environmental and ecological considerations) and development aspects
into account at an early stage.
2. Resource use decisions should seek to optimise the net benefits to the commu-
nity from the nation's resources, having regard to efficiency of resource use, environ-
mental considerations, ecological integrity and sustainability, ecosystem integrity and
sustainability, the sustainability of any development and an equitable distribution of the
return on resources.
3. Commonwealth decisions, policies and management regimes may provide for
additional uses that are compatible with the primary purpose values for the area,
recognising that in some cases both conservation (including all environmental and eco-
logical considerations) and development interests can be accommodated concurrently
or sequentially, and, in other cases choices must be made between alternative uses or
combinations of uses.
Resource Assessment Commission Act, Sched. 1, § 7 (emphasis added).
14. Resource Assessment Commisssion Act § 7. Reports were prepared by the Commis-
sion on mining in the Kakadu region in the Northern Territory of Australia, on Australia's forest
and timber resources and on Australia's coastal zone management. See 1 RESOURCE ASSESS-
MENT COMM'N, KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE INQUIRY (Final Report 1991) [hereinafter 1
KAKADU INQUIRY]; 2 RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE IN-
QUIRY (Final Report 1991) [hereinafter 2 KAKADU INQUIRY]; RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N,
KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE INQUIRY (Final Report Summary 1991); RESOURCE ASSESS-
MENT COMM'N, FOREST AND TIMBER INQUIRY (Final Report Overview 1992); 2A RESOURCE
ASSESSMENT COMM'N, FOREST AND TIMBER INQUIRY (Final Report 1992); 2B RESOURCE As-
SESSMENT COMM'N, FOREST AND TIMBER INQUIRY (Final Report 1992); RESOURCE ASSESSMENT
COMM'N, A SURVEY OF AUSTRALIA'S FOREST RESOURCE (1992); RESOURCE ASSESSMENT
COMM'N, COASTAL ZONE INQUIRY: A NATIONAL COASTAL ACTION PLAN (Draft Conclusions
and Recommendations of the Coastal Zone Inquiry 1993); RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N,
COASTAL ZONE INQUIRY (Final Report Overview, 1993) [hereinafter COASTAL INQUIRY]; RE-
SOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, COASTAL ZONE INQUIRY (Overview 1993).
15. Environment Protection (Impact of Proposals) Act 1974, No. 164, AUSTL. ACrS P.
(1974). The Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) process is very open to criticism because it
petitions the government directly, unlike the one-step-removed process before the Commission.
16. A Reference is the ambit of inquiry that is placed before a Commission of Inquiry.
References are made to the Commission from the Australian Prime Minister under the Resource
Assessment Commission Act § 16.
1994]
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
quiry"). 17 The Commission's report was released by its Chairman,
Mr. Justice Stewart, in February 1991 for public comment and the fi-
nal report was tabled in the Federal Parliament on April 26, 1991.
This report was the Commission's first published views on the mean-
ing of "sustainable development." The report also made recommen-
dations concerning the. use of land within the Kakadu Conservation
Zone ("Conservation Zone"), an area adjoining the Kakadu National
Park within the Alligator Rivers Region of the Northern Territory.18
The Conservation Zone is Federal Crown Land and contains min-
eral deposits on at least two sites that are held under mineral explora-
tion leases at Coronation Hill and El Sherana. The earlier
proclamation of the adjacent area as a National Park had brought it
within federal ambit through the National Parks and Wildlife Conser-
vation Act of 1975.19 The effect of the National Parks and Wildlife
Conservation Act was to prohibit exploration and mining within the
National Park. All mining activity within the Conservation Zone be-
came subject to prior federal government approval.
The Commission was instructed under its Terms of Reference to
assess the environmental and cultural values of the Conservation
Zone and the effect that mining would have upon those values. It was
instructed to consider the national economic significance of mining
within the Conservation Zone and the way in which mining may affect
the local Aboriginal population.20 Balancing losses and benefits of
both quantifiable and unquantifiable interests in resource matters had
been recognised in the Commonwealth Discussion Paper on Ecologi-
cally Sustainable Development of 1990 as an assessment of subjective
elements that would be difficult to translate into monetary values.21
The Commission echoed the difficulty of measuring competing views
of the collective good in their inquiry into mining in the Conservation
Zone:
17. The parameters of the Commission's Inquiry are set by the Terms of Reference of the
Inquiry. Under the Commission's legislation, these are established by the Prime Minister. The
Prime Minister issued the Terms of Reference for the Kakadu Inquiry on April 26, 1990. 1
KAKADU INOUIRY, supra note 14, at 1. The first Reference to the Commission was made on
November 26, 1989, into Australia's forest and timber resources. That report was tabled in early
1992.
18. The Conservation Zone of the Kakadu National Park comprises approximately 47.5
square kilometres and acts as a buffer to the National Park. 1 KAKADU INOUIRY, supra note 14,
at 2.
19. National Parks and Wildlife Conservation Act 1975, No. 12, AusrL. ACTS P. (1975).
20. 1 RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE 2 (Draft Report
1991) [hereinafter 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft].
21. DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT: A COMMONWEALTH DISCUSSION PAPER 5 (1990).
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One of the [Kakadu] Inquiry's most complex tasks is to ensure that
account is taken of the divergent views that members of society hold
about the values of resources. It is the opinion of the [Kakadu] In-
quiry that all systems of belief, including the wide spectrum of per-
sonal and group values held in relation to the resources of the
Conservation Zone are worthy of respect. An assessment of the
value of resources to the community must be informed by an under-
standing of the range of beliefs and ethical frameworks of commu-
nity members. Accordingly, the [Kakadu] Inquiry has endeavored
to take all points of view into account in preparing its draft report.22
The Commission was asked to specify the values associated with
archaeological, physical, biological, water, recreational and tourism
resources that it identified. Both the Conservation Zone and sites ad-
jacent to it contain Aboriginal archaeological sites that the Report de-
scribed as "rich" and "significant. ' 23 The ecological diversity of the
Conservation Zone was a largely descriptive account as little research
had been done on the ecological dynamics of the area.24 Mineral re-
sources were described as "geologically diverse and . . . [with] high
mineral prospectivity. ' '25 The landscape was said to "represent[ ] the
[Conservation] Zone's greatest recreational resource. '26 Wildlife and
Aboriginal artifacts also represented attractions for potential tourism.
Assessments of the value of these assets differed for each asset.
The Commission considered the archaeological resources to be of
both national and international importance when compared with sites
of the same class in Australia and the number of other sites in the
same class. The amount of cultural information that could come from
further investigation of the sites, the tourist potential of the sites, and
the subjective importance of the sites to the indigenous Jawoyn people
were all taken into account in the Commission's high valuation of
archaeological resources in the area.27
The value of the physical and biological resources were assessed
by considering if the Conservation Zone contained endangered,
threatened, vulnerable, or rare species. The Commission also consid-
ered if the features of the Conservation Zone distinguished it from its
surroundings through its diversity, species, and richness of ecological
function. Although noting that some features of the Conservation
Zone fulfilled these criteria, the Commission did not seek to ascribe
22. 1 CONSERVATFION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 9-10.
23. Id. at 18-19.
24. Id. at xviii.
25. Id.
26. Id. at 32.
27. Id. at 37-39.
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all encompassing objective values to the area. Instead, it noted the
area's national and international significance through placement on
national and international environmental protection registers. 28 The
Commission found existing water to be essential to continued ecologi-
cal survival of the Conservation Zone. For all proposed activities, in-
cluding mining, water was considered to hold intrinsic value, though
this value was not quantified in monetary terms by the Commission.
With respect to the values attached to recreational and tourism
potential within the area, the Commission concluded that the complex
geology of the Conservation Zone, its varied and scenic topography,
and the availability of good vantage points gave the area considerable
potential for recreation and tourism. 29 Values included wilderness
that was not pristine, but which provided for edge use of wilderness
outside the Conservation Zone. Recreational opportunities were as-
sessed on the basis of preferences expressed by visitors to Kakadu
National Park, ascertained through questionnaires. 30
Having identified the environmental and cultural values con-
tained within the Conservation Zone, the Commission considered the
impact the proposed mining would have upon those values. It con-
cluded that there was some potential for the National Estate values of
the Conservation Zone to be affected adversely by mining, but that it
was unlikely that Australia's obligations under international conserva-
tion conventions and agreements, including the World Heritage Con-
vention, would be affected by mining the area.31 The Commission
estimated that the national economic significance of potential mining
development in the Conservation Zone represented a net value of
eighty-two million dollars in 1991 (Australian) dollar values. The cost
benefit analysis methodology used to arrive at this figure did not take
into account any broader social costs and benefits-the externalities-
that could flow from the mining project. The social costs not assessed
in monetary terms included environmental impacts, training pro-
grams, spinoffs from mining infrastructure and technology, educa-
28. The Conservation Zone is included on the Register of the National Estate because of its
"special value for future generations." 2 KAKADU INQUIRY, supra note 14, app. J at 85. Kakadu
National Parks Stages 1 and 2 were already on the World Heritage List, with Stage 3 subse-
quently nominated for the World Heritage List in 1991. Stage 3 is now listed on the World
Heritage List.
29. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 39.
30. 2 RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, 1 KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE 276 (Draft Re-
port 1991). The Commission attached economic values to tourism potential by using a model of
the Northern Territory economy and placing the value of tourism within the model. See id.
31. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 75.
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tional, scientific or cultural services, and government infrastructure
support.
Assessing the objective aesthetic values of the Conservation
Zone was understandably problematic. The Commission commented
that: "The broad scope and changing perceptions of aesthetics make
the task of assessing such values difficult. Aesthetic values are inher-
ently subjective .... *"32 A contingent valuation survey was under-
taken to place monetary valuations on the preservation value of the
Conservation Zone.33 To assess the simple existence value of the
Conservation Zone, a survey was conducted of people likely to be af-
fected by a change in the use of the Zone. They were asked how
much they would be prepared to pay to prevent possible environmen-
tal damage from mining the Conservation Zone. The results of the
survey showed that Australians in 1991 were willing to pay $123.80 per
person for ten years to avoid any environmental damage from min-
ing.34 The Draft Report regarded this amount to be a demonstration
of a willingness by Australians to pay a "considerable amount[ ]" to
preserve the National Park.35 Interestingly, Northern Territory resi-
dents were prepared to pay considerably less than this amount to en-
sure preservation of the area.36 The study surveyors could not explain
this, but suggested that possibly the "respondents in the Northern Ter-
ritory sample were taking account of possible financial or other per-
sonal gains from mining and netting these out of the costs to the
environment. '37
The Commission's Draft Report drew the tentative conclusion
from this cost-benefit analysis of intangible values that Australians
were willing to pay much more money to prevent mining than the new
economic benefits of eighty-two million dollars that would potentially
be gained from mining.38 However, the extended cost-benefit analysis
methodology of the contingent valuation survey drew so much criti-
cism that it was not included in the Commission's Final Report that
was ultimately tabled in the Federal Parliament. The criticism was di-
rected primarily at the method of gathering information for the survey
32. Id. at 48.
33. See DAVID IMBER ET AL., A CONTINGENT VALUATION SURVEY OF THE KAKADU CON-
SERVATION ZONE (Resource Assessment Comm'n Research Paper No. 3, 1991).
34. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 210.
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. IMBER, supra note 33, at viii.
38. 1.CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 95-96.
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and, secondarily, towards the gesture of placing aesthetic desire as an
item quantified in dollar terms.
The Commission considered the negative response of local Ab-
original people to mining in the area to be the central issue of the
Kakadu Inquiry. Ecological concerns ranked as a secondary consider-
ation to this primary concern.39 The Aboriginal community that ap-
peared before the Commission opposed mining in the area because it
would cause disturbance to traditional sites of cultural and spiritual
significance. Two sites partly within the Conservation Zone are regis-
tered under the Northern Territory Sacred Sites Act of 1988.40 One of
the registered sacred sites covers a substantial part of the land that
would be required for the Coronation Hill mine.41
The Commission identified some potential for limited positive
economic results for the Aboriginal population through employment
and royalties if mining were to take place. Mining would bring little
economic gain from tourism and recreation proposals and it could po-
tentially have negative social impacts. On the basis of evidence taken
from the Jayowyn people, the Commission identified a belief amongst
Aboriginals that tourism and recreation, rather than mining, was the
preferred long-term use for the area.42
The Kakadu Inquiry identified two main options for the future
use of the resources of the Conservation Zone. Under the first op-
tion, mining would proceed and either: (i) the remainder of the Con-
servation Zone would become part of Kakadu National Park (which
would have the effect under the National Parks and Wildlife Act of
1975 of prohibiting further mining in that area); or (ii) the remainder
of the Conservation Zone would remain a Conservation Zone with no
further mineral exploration until the Coronation Hill experience had
been assessed; or (iii) exploration would be permitted in the Conser-
vation Zone, with mining proposals to be assessed in light of the Coro-
nation Hill experience.
39. 2 RESOURCE ASSESSMENT COMM'N, KAKADU CONSERVATION ZONE 239 (Draft Report
1991).
40. Northern Territory Sacred Sites Act, No. 29, N. TERR. AUSTL. LAWS (1988). This Act
defines and lists Aboriginal sacred sites in the Northern Territory of Australia as well as attach-
ing certain executive and administrative responsibilities to the Northern Territory government in
relation to those nominated sites.
41. Under present federal legislation, registration of the sites may itself preclude the activ-
ity of mining. Aboriginal and Torres Strait Heritage (Interim Protection) Act 1984, No. 79, §§ 3,
9, 10, 22, Austl. Acts (1984).
42. It has been a matter of continuing debate amongst Aboriginal groups and mining devel-
opers whether this view is an accurate representation of broad consensus of the Aboriginal com-
munity in that area.
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Under the second option, mining would not proceed at Corona-
tion Hill, and either: (i) the whole of the Conservation Zone would
become part of Kakadu National Park; or (ii) further exploration
would be permitted in the Conservation Zone, with mining proposals
to be assessed in the light of the Coronation Hill experience.
To reach a decision, the Commission said there needed to be
"comparisons between the net benefits from development, which are
usually quantifiable in monetary terms, and the potential effects On
the cultural and natural environment, which are difficult to express in
monetary terms. '43
Furthermore, a timely and firm decision was required from the
federal government on Coronation Hill or uncertainty would effect
future mining investments in Australia. The Commission noted: "If
firm policies and procedures are not established, the economic conse-
quences of not permitting mining at Coronation Hill could be much
greater than those indicated by the cost benefit analysis . . . ."44 The
Commission concluded that balancing competing interests in the fu-
ture use of the Conservation Zone lay primarily between two factors:
(i) the interests of the Aboriginal people who had strong views that
the mining should not take place, and the relatively small economic
advantage that would arise from the mining project; (ii) the monetary
net benefits to the entire Australian economy of mining the Conserva-
tion Zone.
There was no consistent approach or common principles and
mechanisms for resolving and reconciling different values amongst
parties who had made representations before the Inquiry. The Draft
Report commented that "[diespite widespread agreement about the
general principles of environmental protection and sustainable devel-
opment, no agreed environmental or resource management ethic was
evident among [Kakadu] Inquiry participants. ' '45 In an attempt to for-
mulate a reconciliatory mechanism, the Commission had to resort to
the four factors contained within Principle Two of the policy principles
in the Resources Assessment Commission Act of 1989: (i) efficiency;
(ii) ecosystem and ecological integrity; (iii) sustainability; and (iv)
equity.46
The Commission did not attempt to define "efficiency" so it is not
possible to judge if it was being used in the economic sense of Pareto
43. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 133.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 138.
46. Id.
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distribution of resources. Instead, it was defined (by an unexplained
logic) with reference to "development" within section three of the Re-
source Assessment Commission Act of 1989. This section defines de-
velopment as "the modification of the biosphere to satisfy human
needs and improve the quality of life." 47 Reference was made to a
broader concept of "real" development that included "meeting...
emotional and spiritual needs and desires, advance in skills, knowl-
edge and capability and the ability to choose between various courses
of action," 48 rather than a definition of development based purely
upon economic growth. Efficiency at the national level on a long term
basis therefore needed to look to economic, social, environmental,
and intergenerational issues. The Commission considered that the
broader efficiencies were not immutable, but evolutionary: "It would
be desirable to take account of socioeconomic, ecological, cultural and
other objectives in considering issues of resource allocation ... but it
must be recognised that society's preferences may also change. '49
The Commission considered the definition of "ecological and
ecosystem integrity," which is suggested by environmental econo-
mists50 to be too narrow because it failed to make allowance for the
dynamics of ecosystems and interactions between species.51 Despite
adopting a broader definition of efficiency that took those dynamics
into account, the Commission found that the proposed mine at Coro-
nation Hill did not present unacceptable risks to the integrity of the
ecology of the Conservation Zone of Kakadu National Park. The
Commission pointed out that there was no international or national
agreement on the definition of environmental sustainability. The
Commission considered that it should be a broad definition that ought
be placed in "an economy-wide and world-wide context. ' 52 The criti-
cal issue was not the effect upon resource prices that could follow
from tighter controls, but how society responded to those controls by
developing substitutes and other technological advances. The Commis-
sion appeared, therefore, to accept classical economic price theory.
"Sustainability" thus defined would be counted upon to precipitate
business incentives to innovate in resource use, or to encourage re-
source substitution through economic necessity. Valuing environmen-
47. Resource Assessment Commission Act, pt. 1, No. 3.
48. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 139.
49. Id.
50. See DAVID PEARCE ET AL., BLUEPRINT FOR A GREEN ECONOMY (1989).
51. See id.
52. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 143.
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tal resources in an economy-wide and world-wide context would affect
the costs of resource use and thus alter business practices in the
marketplace.
The Commission considered that there were many issues of eq-
uity that came within the scope of its Kakadu Inquiry. For example,
the Commission considered that it was an equity issue that Australia
may gain an elitist and preservationist profile overseas if it banned
mining.53 It was also an equity issue that the major portion of the
economic benefits of mining in the Conservation Zone would be going
to those who already possessed wealth and power.54 "Equity" was
defined as "fair, impartial and just. It implies a concern for improving
the welfare of the disadvantaged on a national and global scale and
for protecting the vulnerable, including those yet to be born. It also
implies equal rights of access to decision makers. '55
The main equity issue identified by the Commission related to the
concerns of the Aboriginal people. It considered that the lack of eq-
uity that the federal government would exemplify should it disregard
their views would be significant. This needed to be balanced with the
lack of equity that would come from denying the Jawoyn people the
minimal economic advantages they might reap were mining to pro-
ceed. The Commission therefore identified a number of views of col-
lective good that incorporated both happiness and wealth
maximisation. 56
The conclusion of both the Draft Report and the Final Report
tabled in the Federal Parliament made it clear that, whilst the Com-
mission could outline the issues to be considered, ultimately the extent
of environmental regulation depended entirely upon the objectives of
government.
[T]he dilemma facing the Australian Government is clear: should it
set aside the strong views held by the Aboriginal people ... in fa-
vour of securing increases in national income of the order that
seems likely from this project? To do so would be contrary to the
wish of the main political parties to build better relations with the
Aboriginal community and could also bring about international crit-
53. 1 KAKADU INOUIRY, supra note 14, at 33.
54. Id.
55. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 144.
56. The Australian federal government's moves to hear and act upon the views of Austra-
lia's indigenous peoples have been boosted by the Mabo decision of the High Court, which
overturned the application of the doctrine of terra nullius to the Murri Islander people (an island
community off the Queensland coast). See Mabo v. Queensland [No. 2], 175 C.L.R. 1 (1992)
(Austl.). Subsequently, the federal government has passed the Native Title Act of 1993 and a
social and economic "package" of compensation is to be announced this year.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
icisms that Australia continues, as in the past, to treat its Aboriginal
community less than fairly.57
The Commission's last report inquired ("Coastal Inquiry") into
the management and the use of the resources of Australia's Coastal
Zone ("Coastal Zone").58 The Commission identified pollution of riv-
ers, lakes, seas and urban sprawl as the factors placing the most strain
on the Coastal Zone. The Coastal Zone was identified as a diminish-
ing national asset (especially with Australia's increasing tourist indus-
try) that was irreplaceable. Damage had been caused because the
serious consequences of human activity had either not been identifi-
able at the time, or had been ignored well past the point where dam-
age could be properly rectified. The Commission arrived at three
main conclusions about sustainable development of the Coastal Zone:
(i) conservation issues need to play a much larger part in Coastal
Zone management; (ii) there needs to be a greater vision than in the
past, because "[t]he luck ran out a long time ago;" 59 and (iii) there
needs to be a national approach to the management of the Coastal
Zone because the lack of coordination amongst the many govern-
ments (federal, state, and local) that have jurisdiction in the coastal
zone is leading to negative environmental, social and economic
problems.
This last conclusion is the most sweeping. The Commission was
at pains to emphasise that, although the national approach would be
signified by federal legislation, this would not be something that the
federal government would control. "A national approach is a cooper-
ative partnership, where the roles and responsibilities of each of the
partners are agreed, defined and respected in the interests of the na-
tion as a whole."' 60 The aim would be to steer all levels of govern-
ments to the common goal of achieving ESD. To do this successfully,
"adaptability must be of the essence. There is no place for inflexible
master-plans driven from the centre."' 61
The recommendations of the Coastal Inquiry were intended to
ensure that future decisions that could effect the Coastal Zone would
incorporate methods and processes whereby:
57. 1 CONSERVATION ZONE, Draft, supra note 20, at 134.
58. COASTAL INQUIRY, supra note 14. The Coastal Inquiry (Final Report) was delivered to
the Australian Prime Minister on November 24, 1993 and tabled in the Senate at the Australian
Federal Parliament on December 8, 1993. Id.
59. Resource Assessment Comm'n, Chairman's Remarks at Manly Beach, BULLETIN, Dec.
1993, at 2 [hereinafter BULLETIN] (reporting Justice Stewart's speech, given on December 8,
1993, regarding the release of the Commission's Final Report on Australia's Coastal Zone).
60. Id. at 3.
61. Id.
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0 the long view prevails over the short, the prudent over the expe-
dient, and the considered over the hastily-conceived
* broad considerations predominate over narrow
" the techniques of modern management, and the tools of modern
economics be brought into operation
* people being affected by the decisions (including indigenous
people) are adequately consulted before decisions are made.62
In seeking these results, the Coastal Inquiry adopted an approach
that does not cast Canberra (Australia's capital city and seat of the
federal parliament) in the principal role. It focused not just on the
symptoms of problems in the Coastal Zone, but on the management
systems that allow them to occur. It made practicality a most basic
consideration. The Coastal Inquiry recommended a program of ac-
tion comprising four elements: (i) a set of nationally agreed Coastal
Zone management arrangements; (ii) arrangements for managing the
program; (iii) greater community and industry involvement; and (iv)
the use of innovative management mechanisms. 63
The Commission proposed that all spheres of government (fed-
eral, state, and local) agree on national objectives and national princi-
ples for achieving them.64 They could then adapt them to their own
needs and circumstances. Individual state governments should formu-
late their own objectives and principles and local councils should also
formulate objectives and principles that reflect local needs and con-
cerns. All of the objectives and principles at the state and local gov-
ernment levels must be consistent with those agreed upon
nationally.65
Hitherto, different spheres of government in Australia usually en-
gage in joint action through specific agreements. They do not nor-
mally have the agreement underpinned by legislation. The
Commission's Coastal Inquiry, however, agreed with the views of
some community groups, and it noted that existing agreements had
lacked the impact initially promised due to the absence of underlying
federal legislation. Accordingly, the Commission proposed the enact-
ment of a Commonwealth Coastal Resource Management Act.66
This Act would incorporate the objectives and principles for
coastal management agreed upon by the federal, state and local gov-
62. Id.
63. For the suggested nationally coordinated approach, see COASTAL INQUIRY, supra note
14, at ch. 5.
64. Id. at 33.
65. Id. at 34.
66. Id. at 35.
19941
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
ernments. The Commission recommended that the proposed Act link
federal funding of activities in the Coastal Zone to activities consistent
with nationally agreed objectives and principles.67 Coastal Zone ac-
tivities inconsistent with the objectives and principles agreed upon by
all governments nationally would be ineligible for federal money.68
By the very fact of its enactment, the Coastal Resource Management
Act would underline the importance of the Coastal Zone in national
affairs. The Commission's Chairman suggested:
If a spirit of cooperation continues to prevail-as it has throughout
our inquiry during which all of the states participated willingly in
our deliberations, along with the Commonwealth, local government,
industry and community groups, including indigenous interests, all
of whom supported the concept of a national approach-there is no
reason why Australia in the management of its coastal zone re-
sources cannot be an example to the world. If, on the other hand,
we continue in the way that we have, then we are in for a bleak
future. It will not be easy: we are not proposing a quick fix. Gov-
ernments alone cannot do it. People can. This report tells how.6 9
II. FEDERAL ESD POLICY, 1989-
In June 1990, the Australian federal government's Discussion Pa-
per on Ecologically Sustainable Development70 began a process of con-
sultation and collaboration between actors in nine industry and
economic sectors (identified by the federal government) and peak na-
tional organisations in industry, environment, unions, welfare and
consumer groups, and also government officials. The nine key indus-
trial sectors identified were: agriculture, energy use, energy produc-
tion, fisheries, forestry, manufacturing, mining, tourism, and
transport. 71 Their final reports were released in November 1991 after
extensive round-table consultations, and placed in the hands of fed-
67. Id. at 365. Under Australia's federal Constitution, allocation of monies from the fed-
eral to state government can be made conditional upon terms set by the federal government.
Aus-L. CoNsT. ch. II, § 96. The Coastal Inquiry's (Final Report) recommended that the Com-
monwealth should:
[E]nact a Coastal Resource Management Act, which, among other things, would pro-
vide that Commonwealth funding of resource management activities-whether in the
form of direct expenditure by Commonwealth agencies on coastal zone management or
as grants to State and local governments for specific elements of coastal zone manage-
ment-be confined to activities consistent with the objectives and principles of the Na-
tional Coastal Action Program.
COASTAL INQUIRY, supra note 14, at 365.
68. COASTAL INQUIRY, supra note 14, at 36.
69. BULLETIN, supra note 59, at 4.
70. DEPARTMENT OF PRIME MINISTER & CABINET, supra note 21.
71. Id. at 28-40.
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eral government departments. 72 Also in November 1991, the Heads
of Government (comprising representatives of state, federal, and local
governments) agreed on a co-operative intergovernmental process for
examining the recommendations of the ESD reports, and established
the intergovernmental ESD Steering Committee to coordinate assess-
ment of recommendations in the Working Group reports. In 1992, the
federal government released a draft of the resulting Ecologically Sus-
tainable Development Strategy in 1992 for public comment. The final
report of the National Strategy for Ecologically Sustainable Develop-
ment ("ESD Strategy"), which was released in December 1992, incor-
porated aspects of the comments received on the Draft.73
The ESD Strategy sets out a goal, core objectives and guiding
principles, which, as a result of being adopted by the Heads of Gov-
ernment in 1992, must be implemented in all government activity.
The goal of the ESD Strategy is development that improves the total
quality of life, both now and in the future, in a way that maintains the
ecological processes on which life depends. Its core objectives are: (i)
to enhance individual and community well-being and welfare by fol-
lowing a path of economic development that safeguards the welfare of
future generations; (ii) to provide for equity within and between gen-
erations; and (iii) to protect biological diversity and maintain essential
ecological processes and life-support systems.
72. See ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT -
AGRICULTURE (1991); ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL
REPORT - ENERGY USE (1991); ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING
GROUP, FINAL REPORT - ENERGY PRODUCTION (1991); ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVEL-
OPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT - FISHERIES (1991); ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE
DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT - FOREST USE (1991); ECOLOGICALLY SUS-
TAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT - MANUFACTURING (1991); ECO-
LOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT - MINING (1991);
ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT - TOURISM
(1991); ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT WORKING GROUP, FINAL REPORT -
TRANSPORT (1991).
73. Of the two hundred or so submissions, most "advocated acceptance of, and mechanisms
for implementation of the final recommendations from the ESD Working Groups and Chairs;
the clearer identification of priorities and of agencies responsible for implementation; and clarifi-
cation of the linkages between this Strategy and other government policies and initiatives."
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 13 (Dec. 1992) [here-
inafter ESD STRATEGY]. These recommendations are set out in tabular form in COMPENDUM OF
ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT RECOMMENDATIONS: AN ACCOMPANYING Doc-
UMENT TO THE NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR ECOLOGICALLY SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT AND
THE GREENHOUSE STRATEGY (Dec. 1992). Additionally, the National Environmental Protec-
tion Council Bill 1994 (Commonwealth) was presented to federal parliament in August 1994,
acting upon the ratification by the Australian council of governments of the ESD Strategy in
February 1994 (with the exception of western Australia). The only state government to enact
mirror legislation pursuant to the federal Bill so far is Queensland, which presented the Environ-
mental Protection Bill to the Queensland legislative assembly in September 1994.
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The following are the guiding principles to be implemented: (i)
decision-making processes should effectively integrate both long and
short-term economic, environmental, social and equity considerations;
(ii) where there are threats of serious or irreversible environmental
damage, lack of full scientific certainty should not be used as a reason
for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation; (iii)
the global dimension of environmental impacts of actions and policies
should be recognised and considered; (iv) the need to develop a
strong, growing and diversified economy which can enhance the ca-
pacity for environmental protection should be recognised; (v) the
need to maintain and enhance international competitiveness in an en-
vironmentally sound manner should be recognised; (vi) cost effective
and flexible policy instruments should be adopted, such as improved
valuation, pricing and incentive mechanisms; and (vii) decisions and
actions should provide for broad community involvement on issues
which affect them.
These guiding principles and core objectives need to be consid-
ered as a package. No objective or principle should predominate over
the others. A balanced approach is required that takes into account
all these objectives and principles to pursue the goal of ESD.74 Com-
munity participation and the precautionary principle are both cited as
"Guiding Principles" of the ESD Strategy.
The effect of the ESD Strategy becoming one more government
policy,75 combined with the news in August 1993 that the Commission
was to close down at the end of that year, has created a sense that
ESD may be something of a damp squid. A superficial assessment of
this result might call on standard institutional theory. A shrug of the
shoulders would imply that, of course, once policymakers got their
hands on it, that is the death of its real dynamism. Add to that the
internecine leadership politics in Australia's federal parliament and
hard economic times, and we apparently need look no further.76 That
explanation would leave the consultative processes of ESD with its
integrity intact but its effectiveness in serious doubt. After all, repre-
sentatives of each side of the debate (economic and environmental) in
74. ESD STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 8-9.
75. "All in all, it's just another brick in the wall .... PINK FLOYD, Another Brick in the Wall
Part 2, on THE WALL (Columbia 1979).
76. When Australia's present Prime Minister, Paul Keating, wrested leadership of the Aus-
tralian federal Labor Party from Prime Minister Robert Hawke in 1992, the environmental
lobby lost a powerful ally. Since then, a touch-and-go federal election in March 1993, wherein
the Labor Party retained the power it took from the Liberal Coalition federal government in
1992, and a gruesomely slow economic recovery in Australia have deflected attention from ESD.
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the ESD process and in the Commission had spoken to one another
and produced joint documents. Perhaps that ought to be sufficient.
Arguably, however, the outcomes of the Commission and ESD
processes are unsatisfying to all parties-government (because it has
not been delivered one "right" answer), industry, and conservation-
ists. For instance, the Commission's statutory requirement to consider
environmental losses of an unquantifiable nature, such as aesthetic or
spiritual considerations, 77 was considered a major legislative step in
resource management in Australia, as was the Commission's ability to
consider a broad range of information from sources that would not
have had standing were the matter before a court. It has been sug-
gested that:
The range of matters to be taken into account by the Commission
could well serve as a model for similar legislation .... [Industrial
and conservation concerns are given equal importance by the provi-
sions of the Resource Assessment Commission Act. There is also
some guarantee of an integration of ecological and development
concerns through the processes of the Commission.78
Resource issues are likely to remain contested, but closure of the
Commission has now removed this unique forum. It seems an appro-
priate time to ask: Were we asking the right questions? Experts for
and against a resource proposal can sound unnervingly alike (using
the same methodology and vocabulary, but with different results),
whether they appear before an "independent" (that is, apparently ob-
jective) forum like the Commission, or before a local, state or federal
government. After all, the processes are based upon the same model:
The liberal forum language is evident in the conception of the pro-
cess as beginning with ideas from experts, moving to debates about
trade-offs amongst alternatives defined by these elites, deriving le-
gitimacy from discussions with interest groups and individuals, and
ultimately seeking consensus based on economic realities and polit-
ical practicalities. In other words, throughout the pracess the inter-
ests of the Nation-State a [sic] first and foremost in that they limit
the terms of the debate.79
77. Resource Assessment Commission Act §8(d). See also, KAKADU INQUIRY, supra note
14, at 34.
78. Ben Boer, Sustainable Development and the Business Community: The Challenge of the
1990s, AusTL. CONSTRUCrTION NEWSL., June 1991, at 25, 31.
79. HOUSE COMM. ON INTERIOR AND INSULAR AFFAIRS, 102D CONG., 2D SESS., MULTIPLE
USE AND SUSTAINED YIELD: CHANGING PHILOSOPHIES FOR FEDERAL LAND MANAGEMENT 240
(Comm. Print 1992).
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In other words, the disciplinary formalism of the debate remains con-
servative, because "the simple practice of language ceaselessly restates
the new terrain on the oldest ground. 80
The institutional and popular forces compelling Australia's ESD
Strategy lie neatly within this description:
This Strategy has evolved over several years and through extensive
consultation with all levels of government, business, industry,
academia, voluntary conservation organisations, community-based
groups and individuals. The Strategy's origins stem back to release
of the World Conservation Strategy in 1980, the National Conserva-
tion Strategy for Australia in 1983, and perhaps more importantly,
the 1987 report of the World Commission on Environment and De-
velopment Our Common Future (the Brundtland Report). The
Brundtland Report recognised that sustainable development means
adopting lifestyles within the planet's ecological means. The Report
also made it clear that the world's current pattern of economic
growth is not sustainable on ecological grounds and that a new type
of development is required to meet foreseeable human needs. 81
The influence of the Brundtland Report can be clearly observed
in (iii)-(vi) of the Guiding Principles of the ESD Strategy.8 2 A signifi-
cant feature for critique of the Brundtland Report is the vocabulary in
which it is couched. The document was written in the orthodox eco-
nomic style of the 1980s, when the conventional language of economic
man (homo economus) was influencing government policy world-
wide.83 The Brundtland Report remained largely in the code of ortho-
dox discourse. Its most radical suggestion lay in its argument for
equity between developed and developing nations.
Ecologists, on the other hand, are now looking anew at the disci-
pline of ecology and viewing it as a nonequilibrium paradigm. Change
is possibly the only constant, rather than change heralding a new, but
static, situation. In ecology, this had led to a greater emphasis on un-
derstanding ecological processes, rather than preserving an end-prod-
uct of the system. This is a different view of natural phenomena and
natural systems. It means that, within any spatial and temporal zone,
it can only be assumed that what is observed is what inheres in the
present. This approach observes that natural systems, even if undis-
turbed by human activity, may look very different when viewed a
80. JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., University of Chicago
Press 1982) (1972).
81. ESD STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 12.
82. ESD STRATEGY, supra note 73, at 8.
83. Brundtland Report, supra note 2. Its approach, reflected in its vocabulary, was legal
liberalism with a strong dose of welfarism. Its welfarism was influenced by both western utilita-
rian philosophy and Marxist welfarist redistribution. Id.
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year, a decade, or a century later. It may, however, be possible to
predict to some extent what changes will occur in that natural system
by understanding what processes occur in that zone.8 Each zone will
be affected by its own regional reference systems. These will inform
the idea of "zone," "pattern," and "system."
A similar reappraisal of social interaction and social systems has
been taking place in some western (and therefore, affluent) nations.
What the Brundtland Report did not inc!ude was recognition of the
postmaterial values that had become a significant social and political
force of affluence, especially western european nations, from the late
1970s and throughout the last decade.8 5 At the time that the Brund-
tland Report was released, the postmaterial social movement was a
significant feature in Western Europe, committed to overturning soci-
ety's economic mentality and materialist obsession. The thrust of the
postmaterialist view is that the rationale and the practical means of
overcoming ecological crisises lies in fundamentally restructuring our
way of thinking about nature and our relationship with others in soci-
ety. Postmaterialists seek an integrated approach between people and
nature as the guiding principle for government, administrators, and
citizens.86 Economy, they argue, is a too bounded rationality. It over-
looks vital social elements in peoples' interaction with their environ-
ment.87 Science, economics, and law, they argue, all overlook
extradisciplinary (and, thereby, dissident) views and ideas. The
84. Of course, information collection will always be bounded by the temporal slice in which
it is gathered. Is it likely that natural processes are so bounded by strictly determined life cycles
that data collection during a particular period can be said to represent the systems in that re-
gion? Can it ever be certain that all relevant linkages between systems have been appropriately
considered?
85. RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFr IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990).
86. The postmaterialist values of the new social movements in Western Europe of the last
twenty years, most significantly represented by the political success of die Grunen in pre-unified
West Germany, combined the Marxist critique of capitalism (both traditional liberalism and its
statistical rejoinder, utilitarianism), with goals of an equitable, democratic and more cooperative
society. However, the real politik of the Marxist-Leninist countries prior to the disintegration of
the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics led to a critique of capitalism beyond Marxism. Liberal,
utilitarian and Marxist theory each grew out of the Enlightenment view of progressive technol-
ogy and an optimistic ethos that human structuring of the social environment would not be
limited by reduced stocks of environmental resources. Marxism and postmaterialism both offer
a critique of social and legal relations in which a pattern of dominance exists. As critiques of
capitalism, they are still vitally important, notwithstanding the apparent victory of capitalism
over communism. It seems much more likely that each may need the other to achieve their
objectives. The theoretical aim of both theories (socialism, which became Marxist-Leninism, and
liberalism) is to facilitate democratic participation and equality. Both have floundered on this
point.
87. The early postmaterialists were much influenced by Arne Naess, a Norwegian philoso-
pher, who articulated an intrinsic connection between ecology and philosophy. See Arne Naess,
The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement: A Summary, 16 INOUIRY 99 (1973).
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postmaterialists want to validate language that does not sit within the
cognitive and rhetorical boundaries of the disciplines.88 This calls for
removing the ranking of the disciplines as intellectually and psycho-
logically superior to nondisciplinary views.8 9
There is a common impulse between the new, nonequilibrium
view of ecology and the new social movements 9° in that they both
seek dislodgment of the old view in a Kuhnian paradigm shift.
Neither the new ecology nonequilibrium paradigm nor the postmater-
ial paradigm is particularly radical. Both, I suggest, have insights to
offer ESD. But in order to carry the postmaterial view forward, it is
necessary to first read it against itself. By this, I mean that it needs to
have its own (conservative) reformatory impulse applied to its essen-
tialism about "nature," both as a view of nature itself and as a view of
nature as a model for social relations. The remainder of this essay
looks to the postmaterialist vision, with its ecological sensibilities and
its emphasis upon horizontal social relations, and considers how this
rather fuzzy vision may be developed from within so as to reread and
revitalise ESD in Australia. Like Western Europe of the 1980s, Aus-
tralia is affluent. Unlike contemporary Western Europe, Australia
cannot plead political instability as an impediment to the reformatory
impulse behind ESD.91
III. SUSTENANCE FOR ESD
Postmaterialism advocates abolition of social hierarchies outside
the discourse of expertise to encourage a plurality of forms and activi-
ties. However, neither the simple or naive communitarian values of
face-to-face democracy and decentralisation, nor the use of diverse
and efficient technologies necessarily lead to the pursuit of sounder
88. For a description of the self-discipline of the disciplines of expertise, see Pierre Schlag,
Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REv. 167, 181 n.41 (1990).
89. Though it does not necessarily call for wholesale removal of the discipline themselves.
On this view, "disciplines" becomes a site of information, rather than necessarily a voice of
authority.
90. The new social movements incorporate the ecology, peace and women's movements.
91. According to research conducted during the 1990 Australian federal election, in Austra-
lia, there is now a similarly high percentage of people expressing these postmaterialist values as
there was in Europe in the early 1980s, although the values are not only the preserve of the
younger generations. This led to a record number of candidates contesting the 1990 federal
election. Whilst it is not necessarily the case that these postmaterialist values are yet influencing
the voting patterns of people in direct contrast to the influences of economic issues, it is clear
that public values are changing to place a greater emphasis on noneconomic issues. For an anal-
ysis of the motivation of the generally educated, middleclass people who have formed environ-
mental coalition lobby groups, see THE GREENING OF AUSTRALIAN POLITICS: THE 1990
FEDERAL ELECTION (Clive Bean et al. eds., 1990).
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ecological principles, unless the legal and political order also reflects
these values. These ideas seek alternatives to present systems, but
they tend to ignore the implications of economic development
through their overly abstract and essentialist view of nature. An inde-
terminate position on socioeconomic interests in favour of focussing
on preservation of the environment leaves postmaterialism open to
charges of an unrealistically nostalgic view of national and interna-
tional economic relations at the close of the twentieth century. It
gives little indication of how to guide the social process of industrial
society as an ecologically sustainable alternative to orthodox para-
digms. Postmaterialism offers a deconstruction of industrialised soci-
ety, but as yet offers no reconstructed vision within ecological limits
that adequately answers charges of utopianism and vagueness.92
The postmaterialist vision would have us turn from homo
economus to homo ecologicus. The similarity between these two
otherwise antithetical visions lies in their each having an idealised pic-
ture of the good society. The objectives of each are also the same: To
seek equity and freedom within ecological constraints. The Brund-
tland Report, and now Australia's ESD Strategy, would have us do it
via economic means, in a mixture of homo economus philosophical
values shared by liberalism, utilitarianism and a dash of socialist
(re)distribution. The postmaterialists would have a good society
based upon a nostalgic premodern, pre-urban vision which, suppos-
edly, was more faithful to preindustrial homo ecologicus. Both vi-
sions, although claiming to be emancipatory, rest intrinsically upon
the capacity to locate a fundamental homogeneity in society. What is
important for the praxis of both visions is that citizens share that vi-
sion. The postmaterialists (or simple communications) present a vi-
sion that rests upon consensus-something that becomes ever more
92. The West German Green Party presented the most effective political example during
the 1980s of a philosophy of ecological harmony as the rationale that ought to underlie environ-
mental regulation by the state. Its vision of an ecologically based, nonhierarchical society can
counter the economic jurisprudence of liberalism, utilitarianism, and Marxism. It challenged
liberalism's (mythical) appeal to individual freedom which never-the-less leaves the corporatist
power structure intact. It challenged utilitarianism's attempts to place environmental values
within a monetary calculation as a pathetic attempt of eco-reformism within a capitalist and
industrialist rationalisation. It also challenged Marxism's commitment to technological progress
as the means of social transformation. Its philosophical roots lie equally in Heidigger and his
belief that the moral conception of nature is not a mass of inert matter but has a vital relation-
ship to the human mode of being (Heidigger would say that homo is rooted in humus and that
the moral phenomenology of nature is part of the phenomenology of the Lebenswelt (life-
world)) and in the critique of science offered by Horkheimer and Adorno. See MARTIN
HEIDEGER, BEING AND TIME (J. Macquarie & E. Robertson eds., 1962); MAX HORKHEIMER &
THEODOR W. ADORNO, DIALECTIC OF ENLIGHTENMENT (John Cumming trans., Seabury Press
1972) (1944).
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elusive in an increasingly pluralistic world. It seems romantic because
of its lack of strategic and institutional specificity. Neither legal liber-
alism nor postmaterialism goes far enough, even when they engage in
vigorous eco-reformism. They fail to recognise that society is increas-
ingly signified by differentiation of peoples. What is called for in the
praxis of ESD is an orchestration of the differentiated many, not a
unitariness of the undifferentiated.
To present a persuasively viable alternative, law and ecology are
turning their attention to processes that more adequately incorporate
ecological sensibilities. They are looking to the methods, not only the
outcomes, of modem institutions. The lack of strategic or institutional
specificity in the eclectic postmaterialist view means that thought
needs to be given to the legal forces that might facilitate its actualisa-
tion. This requires legal policies and methods that further horizontal
relationships. In searching for an approach that better incorporates
environmental consciousness, it must be observed that any approach
must expose itself to heterogeneous outcomes. One can draw upon
the nonequilibrium ecology paradigm to suggest that a unitary theory
of social reality is not possible. Human thought and experience is so
fractured and bounded by social positioning that it defies homogene-
ous description. Environmental issues share the heterogeneity and
specificity that exists in all contested issues and problems.93 In Aus-
tralia, law and ecology's failure to furnish a theoretical basis for radi-
cal change has led to its uneasy coexistence with the dominant system,
rather than being able to overturn the privileged interests it opposes.
On the other hand, to completely jettison the contributions of the
dominant forms would be to "throw out the baby with the bathwater."
My point about ESD in Australia is that it has lost some of its
potency as inspiration and aspiration because it remains a very con-
servative approach to legal reform. The role of law in achieving envi-
ronmental objectives can go no further than the rationale of the state
93. The critique of normative jurisprudence under the now almost meaningless label of
postmodernism has thus far concentrated on theoretical implications upon race, gender, ethnic-
ity, and cultural subordination. It has recognised in relation to these areas of struggle that ignor-
ing the integrated nature of individuals and society leaves these groups vulnerable to
subordination and destruction. Feminist theory in particular has shown that recognising hetero-
geneity and specificity of different female experiences is an integral part of any process that
seeks to remove gender-specific domination. Poststructuralism within postmodern critique also
offers a way of reconceptualising law that suggests a potential to be better cognizant of environ-
mental sensibilities. The terms "postmodernism" and "poststructuralism" have taken on any
number of definitions. They are used here in the sense of disallowing any fixed claim to truth,
though the possibility of that itself becoming a metanarrative of opposition cannot be over-
looked. For a range of descriptions, see Alan Hunt, The Big Fear: Law Confronts Postmodern-
ism, 35 McGILL L.J. 508 (1990).
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within which it operates. Our legal, political, and administrative insti-
tutions are presently part of an overall social schemata that is hierar-
chically structured and divided into interests that are opposing. They
are situationally influenced to emphasise their irreconcilability. This
irreconcilability is embedded by the discourse of expertise that effec-
tively ranks science, law and economics above other voices. Instead of
heralding a brave step beyond orthodox legal forms, ESD is a gentle
sort of eco-reformism, tinkering quiet!y at the edges cf eccncrrnic
structures that otherwise have unsustainable ecological damage as an
intrinsic result.94
The ESD process in Australia was careful to canvas everybody's
concerns-as long as those concerns had a voice that governments
could "hear"; peak bodies, such as industry, wilderness and conserva-
tion groups-with the aim of "balancing" ecology and economy. In
short, no single group's sensibilities should be too bruised. "We" (col-
lectively) must all bear some of the strictures that sensible environ-
mental approaches bring, but no single interest group should have to
"hurt" (that is, need to make more change) significantly more than
another. The ESD process was premised upon information sharing
and negotiation between groups, but in remaining so reliant upon
group interest and group representation, it was effectively embedding
structured lines of communication, even if the lines were now talking
directly to each other rather than shouting at one another in the press
and on radio.95
Contemporary critical approaches articulate a scepticism with
modernism's tools of rationality, scientism, and empiricism. It sug-
gests that, just as poverty is the ineluctable consequence of simple
capitalism, the crisis of legitimacy of the modern state and its institu-
tions is a consequence of the rationality applied within it.96 Environ-
94. Richard Delgado goes even further and suggests that environmental law reform is inva-
riably doomed: "We resist precisely the medicine that could save us. We turn to strong solutions
only when it is either too late, or when our thinking has advanced so far that the solutions seem
commonplace and tame." Richard Delgado, Our Better Natures: A Revisionist View of Joseph
Sax's Public Trust Theory of Environmental Protection, and Some Dark Thoughts on the Possibil-
ity of Law Reform, 44 VAND. L. RIv. 1209, 1212 (1991).
95. At a more fundamental level, the ESD process was activated by, and acting out, our
Cartesian anxiety. The tyranny of dualism meant that the only two available alternatives were
well-mannered discussions, or someone or some interest group being "forced to take the
medicine." The conciliatory impulse of ESD removed the latter, but the well-mannered discus-
sions risk freezing the institutional machinery.
96. The reference to "critical approaches" seeks to encompass the critique of Theodor
Adorno and Jacques Derrida who are frequently associated with a cluster of others that are
labelled poststructuralists. One aspect of my own project is to undermine the coherence of the
very idea of poststructuralism, whilst accepting its targets of critique. See THEODOR W.
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mental degradation has become symbolic of not only the limits of the
modern western state, but also its capacity to turn upon itself in its
ever extended efforts at social engineering. Law's instrumentalism
has participated in alienating individuals and community groups from
the decision-making apparatus of the modern state.97 The self-per-
petuating inclination of the powerful (those within the legal regimes
of "truth") 98 is to portray the legal truth as a universal, as the totality
of thought. Law becomes equated with established norms and
opinions.
The critique of the normative impulse in law demonstrates that,
instead of the legal order representing the normative status quo, it
represents merely one of the alternatives that have been selected, and
consequently elevated, within the dichotomy of truths/untruths. The
critique of scientific rationality, deductive reasoning, and the construct
of dichotomies-right/wrong, nature/culture, subject/object and mind/
body-applies to the orthodox legal method of seeking the one
"right" solution to a problem or conflict. Whilst there may be differ-
ing views within society about whether laws created by the
"truthmakers" are good laws and represent justice, these "opinions" 99
have no formal place in the truth system. "Truth" is in the hands of
specialists-legal, economic, and scientific-and is not easily contesta-
ble by those outside the rings of expertise.
ADORNO, NEGATIVE DIALECTICS (E.B. Ashton trans., Continuum Publishing Co. 1983) (1966);
JACQUES DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., John Hopkins Univ. Press
1976) (1967); HORKHEIMER & ADORNO, supra note 92; Jacques Derrida, Force of Law: The
"Mystical Foundation of Authority", 11 CARDOZO L. REV. 919 (Mary Quaintance trans., 1990).
When turned upon law, this critique exposes the essentialism within law. It seeks to shed light on
the totalising effect of any social, political or legal narrative that arises from a foundationalist
stance. Drucilla Cornell, Toward a Modern/Postmodern Reconstruction of Ethics, 133 U. PA. L.
REV. 291 (1985). Cornell argues against the neo-Aristotelian impulse of legal communitarians
who nostalgically seek to locate a vision of the good life and its virtues from a concept of "man"
as having an essential nature. Id.
97. Rapid industrialisation and technocratision of modern life has enhanced this sense of
alienation and has formed the backdrop for the critique of modernism. LEGITIMACY AND THE
STATE (William Connolly ed., 1984).
98. I use "truth" here in the Foucaultian sense that has influenced Martin Katz and Gary
Wickham in their description of legal truthmakers. See MICHAEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOL-
OGY OF KNOWLEDGE (A.M. Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969); MICHAEL
FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE (Colin Gordon ed. & Colin Gordon et al. trans., Pantheon
Books 1980). See Martin F. Katz, After the Deconstruction: Law in the Age of Post-Structuralism,
24 U.W. ONT. L. REv. 51 (1986); Gary Wickman, Cautious Postmodernism and Legal Truths, 7
LAW IN CONTEXT 39 (1989).
99. We are always bounded by linguistic meaning. "Opinion" is placed in dualistic opposi-
tion to "fact," and unless "proved" by the accepted rational method, remains ranked below
"fact." To view linguistic meaning as the intent of the speaking subject, no more, no less, is
outside the dominant significance of language.
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Both orthodox and western Marxist legal, political, and social cri-
tique, 100 whilst seeking to resist capitalism's worst effects, have failed
to offer a critique that is free of a normative view of human nature.
Ecology suggests a model of law in which environmental sensibilities
are incorporated within law's institutional behaviour, rather than im-
posed upon it.101 Such a legal model would require a revised perspec-
tive of the state and the individual. This revision might carry the
communitarian perspective that individuals are socially constituted
beings; that self-identity is a product of history, race, culture, gender,
and class as much as it is a product of atomistic choice. It might sug-
gest that the ethics of law incorporate contemporary social critique so
that it may recognise differences of social categories. The methods of
law might turn to assisting the process of recognising this differentia-
tion through recognition of, and hence legitimation of, many different
ideologies and values. This suggests that law breaks with ideology to
the extent that it grounds itself in one ideology. This would mean that
law would move against the idea of law as hegemony. Eco-reformism
within orthodox jurisprudence demonstrates how tortuous and inef-
fective it can be to remain faithful to a fixed legal ideology and yet
stretch to accommodate circumstances not foreseen when that ideol-
ogy was formed.10 2
Bolder institutional changes will be required in law if ecological
sensitivities are to be better actualised. The suggested reform is pre-
mised upon the idea that unity as a conceptual tool does not exist in
any real sense. 10 3 Autonomy and consensus are two of the possible
outcomes, although not necessarily mutually opposing. 1°4 Actually
100. Typified in political praxis by the European New Left.
101. Ecology as a discipline is already a move away from traditional methods. In describing
the approach adopted by Henry Regier, the editor of Common Property Resources suggests that,
in contrast to western reductionist science, "[e]cology qualifies as ... [a radical] component[ ]
because, as a science concerned with the whole (rather than with its parts), it stands at the
fringes of the reductionist tradition of Western science." COMMON PROPERTY RESOURCES:
ECOLOGY AND COMMUNITY-BASED SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 89 (Fikret Berkes ed., 1989).
102. An intricate theory of the state and the economy that might effect more radical transfor-
mation would understand that corporatist and institutional power relations will not be undone
by the mere existence of social tension. The power of ideological control is that it is reproduced
by the everyday existence of the dominant interests.
103. Construction in philosophy is necessarily deconstruction, that is to say, a deconstructing
of traditional concepts carried out in a historical recursion of the tradition. It is not a negation of
the tradition or a condemnation of it as worthless; quite the reverse, it signifies precisely a posi-
tive appropriation of tradition.
104. It is possible to combine autonomy and consensus, so that individuals retain an identity
that permits individual choice to become part of, or, as feminist legal theory emphasises, to move
away from, the social grouping (signifying "consensus") in which they may originally find
themselves.
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achieving autonomy or consensus becomes less important when the
focus shifts to the reach for ethical reciprocity amongst people and
between people and their environment. Finally, it may take from the
postmaterialist vision the move beyond consumerism, but stripped of
the essentialism inhering in its appeal to the "feminine" in our ap-
proach to each other and to nature.105
It is not the purpose of this essay to produce something that
would become part of a definitive ethic of sustainable development in
law. That project would have to appeal to some guarantee of its truth
that could somehow be placed outside history and change. It is an
attempt to ask appropriate questions about ways in which environ-
mental regulation and policy could be framed. It is a petition for criti-
cal self-reflection-an attempt to sustain the quest of continually
questioning. The purpose of this quest is two-fold: (i) the dynamic
nature of human interaction with the environment means that the
questions must not only continually be asked, but the questions and
answers must themselves also be continually questioned; and (ii) law's
role in assisting an ongoing process of dialogue is a rejection of dogma
that rides so comfortably on the idea of equilibrium. It is a suggestion
that law act as a catalyst of dialogue, rather than impose "rightness"
that becomes fixity.
The idea is that legal action towards the environment could help
to halt the replication of the economy/ecology dualism through dis-
rupting the idea of essentialism in either. This suggests "that reality
can never be completely enframed."' 10 6 At the theoretical level, it ne-
cessitates a decisive step away from universalistic theories. At the
practical level, it presses for environmental solutions that are respon-
sive and immediate, but without recourse to methodologies of hierar-
chy in either ideological or procedural approaches. Transposed into
the social world, this emphasises horizontal rather than hierarchical
relationships where empowerment is not the goal in all relations. In
that way, perhaps the myriad of possibilities may be revealed. Envi-
ronmental regulation can accept the need for solutions to be drawn at
the point of what is possible, accepting that this is a response that is
105. The postmaterial vision represents in many ways the "ethic of care" which Carol Gilli-
gan would describe as feminine values, in opposition to the masculine "ethic of justice." See
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENr VOICE (1982). Deep ecologists would apply this valorisation
of the feminine by describing the genesis of things as gynesis. See Hwa Yol Jung, Marxism and
Deep Ecology in Postmodernity, in 28 THESIS ELEVIN 86, 91 (1991) (citing ALICE A. JARDINE,
GYNESIS (1985)).
106. DRUCILLA CORNELL, BEYOND ACCOMODATION 140 (1991). Cornell emphasises that
"reality is not as unshakeable as is might 'look."' Id. at 131.
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not a response of principle, but of strategy. Law becomes an instru-
ment in the project of ensuring that the many alternative solutions to
environmental problems are canvassed in a way that does not privi-
lege any one of them in a foundationalist sense. It need not involve
the rejection of economic solutions, but of those solutions needing to
grow from an over-arching economic theory. Law can recognise that
polarised, centralised and sectoral approaches are frequently costly,
both economically and ecologically. It can also recognise that decen-
tralised and integrated approaches towards environmental policy may
take longer, and may offer a multiplicity that discomforts our search
for coherence, fixity, and predictability. Away from the dualistic con-
straints of economy or ecology, it may listen to community values of
interdependence and self-regulation, though not ignore the informa-
tion that comes from economy and science. It can allow for local solu-
tions to be found whilst still searching for broader solutions between
communities, including the global community.
The symposium at which the draft of this paper was presented
showed me the limitations of our linguistic and cultural forms. I came
to the symposium using "community" as a petition for stepping be-
yond formal legal and scientific rationality, to leave the dualism be-
hind as normatively suspect and practically unrewarding.
"Community," I felt, stood as a metaphor for reflexive law, situated
amongst autopoietic groups. 10 7 If there was an ethic I assumed in
"community," it was one of each group's desire to remain open to
others, and the ability of individuals to move freely amongst groups.
"Interest" did not carry any intrinsic connection to "partisanship,"
and "desire" inhered potentially as much in another group's stated
needs as it did in one's own. The consequence for my use of "commu-
nity" in the context of ESD was to open up the ESD debate beyond
sterile, media-specific claims, to much broader concerns. "Commu-
nity" for me carried impulses of hope and trust in ourselves and in
others about the potential for diversity and heterogeneity. It held val-
ues of interconnectedness and horizontal relationships without era-
sure of the individual flowing as a consequence of seeing connections
between individuals. This came from a deeper assumption that the
old dualisms of body/nature, mind/body, and rational/irrational had by
now, loosened their grip on legal consciousness.
107. For a detailed description, see Gunther Teubner, Substantive and Reflexive Elements in
Modern Law, 17 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 239 (1983). See also DILEMMAS OF LAW IN THE WELFARE
STATE (Gunther Teubner ed., 1986).
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At the October symposium, I quickly learned that the linguistic
turn of "community" meant something quite different to my Chicago
audience, than to my own textual baggage. Instead, "community" car-
ried impulses of cynicism and distrust. The consequences of commu-
nity involvement in environmental issues meant identification of
interest groups through rigid demarcation, and adversarially placed
against one another. In short, "community" was a metaphor for "clo-
sure of groups." Environmental disputes remained within the ortho-
dox legal code of bringing disputes before it, though "community" had
extended the number of litigants and given them a louder and better
organised voice. If anything, it seemed that "community" worked to
make vested interests more territorial and aggressive, whether they
were the hard-won gains of environmentalists, or economic interests.
Not only was the ethics versus economics dichotomy still in use, it
appeared to have deepened.
Most interesting of all, I perceived that the environmentalists' list
of human predators had extended beyond the obvious demons, indus-
try and government, to include local citizen groups. "They," the lo-
cals, could not be trusted to do the right thing. It seemed, shocking
and inappropriate as it may be, that the people upon whose behalf all
the political and scholarly energy was being expended, could not see
beyond their own noses. "They" wanted to protect their own environ-
mentally damaging job, or keep that polluting factory in their
neighbourhood. There was no choice but for environmental lobbyists
to close in and hold on fast to the slippery tail of legal reform. I de-
tected a siege mentality. Environmental, political, and legal strategies
needed not so much to be ambitious, as didactic.108
The paradox to this, lay in the acceptance with which the new
ecological insights were received. Ecologists and scientists are seeking
to broaden the ambit of the "ecosystem" because it is acknowledged
that the extent of the ripple effects of environmental disturbance or
damage may be far greater than previously thought. "Ecosystem" is
coming to be a term for sorting information, rather than delineating
where environmental consequences begin and end. It is a word be-
coming more closely associated with elasticity, if not downright uncer-
tainty, rather than connoting closure.
108. The idea that " 'we' must do something now" because human suffering is so apparent
implies that consideration and reconsideration of non-novel ideas such as horizontal social rela-
tionships is wasteful and indulgent "theorising" whilst "practical" issues press in. Part of my own
project is to dislodge the idea of "theory" as categorically opposed or, in some fundamental way,
as different to "practice."
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It is not an overstatement to say that this new ecological ap-
proach is a sweeping change to orthodox ecological approaches. But
possibly not as challenging to its practitioners as environmental law-
yers find proposed change. Ecologists, after all, view their activities as
the process of finding out the yet-undisclosed mysteries of the natural
world. Some scientists may even view that process as finite, as simply
getting enough money for new technology and enough research assist-
ants to operate the new machines. Lawyers do not generally view
themselves as being on a quest of discovery. 1°9 They usually seek to
apply institutional givens to new sociological phenomenon, such as an
awareness that our environmental resources are too stretched, so that
legal processes remain relatively static and legal change is comfortably
conservative.
In many ways, placing "legal regulation" and "community" to-
gether may seem a clash of antithetical notions. Law is, in the main, a
force of domination. Any area of social life that law seeks to regulate
invites the risk of ultimately becoming monopolised by that legal reg-
ulation, simply through becoming the subject of legal rules and admin-
istrative processes. The spontaneity of local decision-making is
frequently lost in the time consuming hierarchy of the legal drama.
Indeed, the reformatory potential of community action towards the
environment seems to be at its height when it is extra-legal, that is,
when it remains outside the realms of orthodox discourse as a voice of
dissent.110 Legal recognition of grass-roots environmental concern
more often than not sounds the death knell of that initial community
involvement. In traversing the divide between disputed discourse to
orthodox discourse, local environmentalism has lost some of its punch.
The trajectory of environmental concerns into the orthodox political
and then legal agenda sees the application of legal norms, bounded as
they are by thought processes of legal rationality. Environmental is-
sues become (another) subject of institutional control-community in-
volvement tends to become marginal, rather than central, to goals of
environmental conservation and protection.
Perhaps this is an overly gloomy picture-that of local environ-
mental concerns becoming a secondary function when law sweeps the
environmental problem up as a legitimate subject for the apparatus of
109. For a scorching analysis of the effects of legal training upon creativity, see Pierre Schlag,
Clerks in the Maze, 91 MICH. L. REv. 2053 (1993).
110. The ESD process in Australia is a good example. When consultation between the par-
ties was taking place, ESD had a momentum that seems to have dissipated, to a large extent,
now that the process is "formal."
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governmental and legal institutions. It is not so much a charge that
law gobbles its subjects; rather, it is a recognition that the autonomy
and self-expression of community environmental groups is at danger
when the environment is brought wholesale within formal administra-
tive and legal control. Bureaucratic and technocratic involvement in
environmental issues that were initially popularised by community
concern is, on the one hand, a signifier of the success of that local
concern. But now that the environment is, more or less, part of the
orthodox political and legal machinery, the question is whether that
machinery is itself intrinsically suited to serving the community in-
volvement that first placed it there. Does the community concern that
placed the environment into the orthodox arena, whether that be
through local government, national or international regulation, or in-
stitutional arrangements, then place it beyond the communities'
reach? Does all that community concern, the energy and the interest,
put the subject of its concern into a place where it must be, can only
be, institutionalised, because that is the very nature of the legal and
political place?
It is not in doubt that environmental concerns have been success-
ful in mobilising legal recognition-they so clearly have. The question
that remains is why local environmental concerns have not gone fiur-
ther in promoting an ethic of dialogue about ESD. Community con-
cern and mobilisation about environmental issues remains one of the
most potent expressions of grass-roots political interest since the so-
cial turmoil of the 1960s. 111 Together with sexual and racial equity,
environmental concern has travelled the road from marginalised dis-
sent to mainstream orthodoxy, at least in theory if not in practice. But
unlike those other issues of social justice, community concern about
environmental degradation has a unique temporal imperative. It is no
longer considered alarmist to set time-lines for environmental im-
provement and reconstruction. It not only makes good economic
sense, but also the tragic consequences to peoples' lives, unless land,
water, and air degradation is minimalised, is now beyond contest.
So far, so good. Community concern has brought us to this point.
But what about the legal system into which this now legitimated sub-
ject of regulation is delivered? Is law institutionally constructed so as
to endorse and enhance the human inspiration of community based
activism? Legal regulation of the environment seems to lead to insti-
tutionalised environmentalism-that is, environment decision-making
111. RONALD INGLEHART, CULTURE SHIFT IN ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1990).
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and solutions tend to become increasingly alienated from community
participation.
If community participation is to remain an ongoing and growing
feature of environmental solutions, the legal institutions which shape
the regulatory process will need a different consciousness of the law's
role. Allowing community participation to be central to environmen-
tal solutions offers an enormous challenge to law or to any group that
"knows what's best (for us all)." In many ways, "community" in envi-
ronmental concerns stands for legal reform that is based upon values
that largely lie outside the rationale of the modern state. The language
of the modern economic and administrative system is primarily chan-
nelled through competition in the market place and the translation of
service and time into money units. "Community" values-as I read
"community"-searches for alternative, noncoercive forms of exist-
ence. It assumes that self-help organisations at the local level are not
intrinsically at odds with the search for environmental goals at the na-
tional and international level.
Where then, does law fit into this aspiration? Clearly, orthodox
legal solutions based upon adversarial, winner-take-all processes have
less of a role. Deductive legal reasoning, the use of scientific and eco-
nomic data and reliance upon legal precedents are of assistance only,
rather than determinative, when dealing with environmental conflict
in which the intergenerational risk is speculative at best, and environ-
mental stake-holders are concerned, for instance, about the aesthetic
or religious and spiritual aspects of land-use.112 To apply the critical
impulse to law is a mechanism of legitimating what is presently
outside legal struggle, whether this be viewed from individuals or
groups. It thereby gives a voice to, and legitimates, the nonlegal. En-
larging provisions of locus standi is an understandable, but essentially
conservative, legal response to environmental conflict. A paradigm
hiccup, rather than a paradigm shift.
A revised description of law as representative of many truths
brings with it the concomitant suggestion that law may have many so-
lutions, each resonating to a particular value or group of values.
These values are not fixed in time because they lay no claim to a uni-
versal essence. The perception of a problem is then free to alter with
time, as it need not continually measure itself against a fixed idea of
essential principles. A nonequilibrium paradigm for law offers more
112. Helen Endre, Legal Regulation of Sustainable Development in Australia: Politics, Eco-
nomics or Ethics?, 32 NAT. RESOURCES J. 486 (1992).
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latitude for legal solutions to alter over time and in response to new
values or new empirical data.113 Enhanced community involvement in
environmental approaches has two potential advantages. First, it dis-
lodges the transformative process of an ecological and social problem
via the funnel of expertise, either through legal definition or an ad-
ministrative function, where it tends to take on a character increas-
ingly removed from its ecological and social context. Second, it opens
up space for development of environmental solutions by the stake-
holders and those who are most directly affected by an environmental
problem.
The idea of problem solving by those who are most directly af-
fected by environmental problems has not lost its power, even if it
may have lost its cachet. Calling in the scientific, social, political and
economic expertise of each environmental subsystem, and setting up
mechanisms that allow for social planning by those who are within the
subsystem, resolves to some extent the legitimacy crisis that occurs
when uniform norms are enforced through adjudication under the
classical model of legal institutions.114 Arguably, it prevents the trans-
formation of an ecological problem into a legal and administrative
problem. The key questions remaining are the interface of different
rationalities occurring across different ecological subsystems, and the
time required to reach a solution when the ecological imperative is
particularly pressing. The measures of success would lie not only in
the reduction of environmental damage, but also in the fluidity along
the continuum of react-and-cure strategies and preventative strate-
gies. This progression could be signified by anticipatory policies that
are not restricted to media-specific regulation (including water and air
pollution) but which are broader in scope. 115 This carries a deeper
significance, because it would transcend traditional administrative and
113. Law's instrumentality in advancing economic interests is without question. Little won-
der that ecological concerns lie in uneasy coexistence within present legal structures. It would,
however, be repeating the same tyranny of interests if law were to turn its protection from its
present economic perspective to a purely ecological perspective. An overnight transformation of
homo economus to homo ecologicus would simply reverse legal bias and silence a different group
of voices. For law to consistently prefer one vision of the good life over another vision of the
good life is based on an assumption of the existence of fundamental homogeneity in society. In
an increasingly pluralistic society, any assumption about a shared community vision of the good
life, whether it be economically based, ecologically based, or any place in between, has the po-
tential to become oppressive. The limitations of environmentalism to become its own oppressive
ideology must not be ignored. It still does not free itself from a central vision of the good life
and therefore does not offer an emancipatory critique. It is at risk of becoming its own totality.
114. JORGEN HABERMAS, LEGIrMATION CRISIS (Thomas McCarthy trans., Beacon Press
1975) (1973).
115. Anticipatory or preventive environmental policy has been described by the Wissen-
schaftzentrum Berlin Fur Sozialforschung [the Science Centre of Berlin] as:
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expert systems that are organised around practical environmental me-
dia. In other words, it would deinstitutionalise the administrative and
scientific technocracies.
Change towards a participatory policy style and towards coopera-
tion between central and the local levels moves away from stasis as an
ontological preference. It requires recognition that "polarized, cen-
tralized and sectoral approaches are [frequently] costly, economically
and ecologically speaking, and that holistic, decentralized and inte-
grated approaches towards environmental policy are intellectually
more demanding ... [but are] at the same time more rewarding." 116
The precautionary principle accepts that environmental regulation
may be justified in the face of extremely limited scientific evidence
and/or lack of unanimous scientific agreement on the level of environ-
mental risk a society should tolerate.1 17
0 Prevention of the spread of all harmful emissions and waste products that exceed
the assimilative capacity of the ecosystems through more and improved recycling, intro-
duction of low emission technologies, and pre-emptive substitution of environmentally
harmful products and production processes.
* Conservation of non-renewable resources, encouragement of the use of highly effi-
cient renewable resources, and drastic reduction or redesign of all combustion
processes.
* Active management of the natural environment allowing for greater participation of
hitherto underrepresented public interests in all relevant planning procedures (indus-
try, infrastructure, technology, energy, agriculture, etc.), and aiming for a strong institu-
tionalisation of the prevention principle throughout society.
UDO ERNST SIMoNIs, ENVIRONMENTAL POLICY IN THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 5
(1991).
116. Id. at 25.
117. Stated at its very plainest, the precautionary principle is the requirement of preventative
action, before scientific proof has been submitted, through recognition that environmental regu-
lation must proceed in the face of inevitable scientific uncertainty. It aims to encourage, and
even to oblige, decision makers to consider the possible damaging effects upon the environment
of their activities prior to undertaking the activity. A more detailed analysis of the elements of
the precautionary principle, and the different understanding it requires in order to implement it,
indicates: (i) prevention of environmental damage is to be preferred to relying upon ex post
facto remedying of environmental degradation because remedying degradation is more expen-
sive than preventing it from occurring, and as toxic pollution has starkly demonstrated, there
may be no effective means of remedying environmental damage; (ii) the burden of proof should
shift to the potential contaminator of the environment satisfying doubt about environmental
consequences prior to undertaking their activity, rather than the burden of proof lying upon
those who, after the activity has been undertaken, having to demonstrate a nexus between the
activity and their environmental damage; and (iii) the quantum of the burden of proof upon the
potential contaminator of the environment needs to shift from the nexus between the activity
and negative environmental consequences being beyond reasonable doubt, to simply a nexus
between the activity and a potential (but not necessarily scientifically demonstrable) threat to
the environment.
For example, the Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the EEC
region stated: "Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of scientific cer-
tainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degra-
dation." Bergen Ministerial Declaration on Sustainable Development in the EEC Region, May
16, 1990, para. 7, reprinted in I.B.1 INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF THE ENVIRONMENT 2d Se-
ries 171 (Bernd Ruster et al., 1991) [hereinafter Bergen Declaration].
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Precaution involves the broadest possible conception of potential
environmental risks. It suggests that there ought to be regulation
where there is no proof of a causal link between toxic emissions, for
example, and harm. The precautionary principle is a move away from
scientific bases for regulation, recognising instead that environmental
problems are cited equally in political and social realms.
The impulse behind precaution and community is to transform
the legal environmental order from one of coexistence to one of coop-
eration. The best legal certainty that is possible at any time can be
obtained through procedures that stipulate cooperative assessment of
potential environmental impacts and information sharing in specific
post project analyses. Cooperation mandates public participation on
equal terms with other legal personalities besides direct economic ac-
tors, in either the public or private sector.118 Combining principles of
precaution and community contributes towards safeguarding common
interests because it fosters (though, of course, cannot ensure)
neighbourly environmental protection. It provides opportunities for
intense regional and national cooperation and involvement of individ-
uals and community groups as legal subjects. Participatory mecha-
nisms are in this sense the practical outcome of institutionalising
precaution. Openness and public participation allow input from non-
governmental, consumer, or other public groups or individuals, and
provide opportunity for challenges to both government and private
sector activities affecting the environment.11 9
Establishing evaluative standards for precaution and assessment
of environmental risk rests, for its effectiveness, upon sharing infor-
mation and unceasing dialogue. Information needs to be as complete
and full as is possible at any point, always recognising that there may
be new information that will call for altered environmental ap-
proaches and standards. For example, the 1987 European Economic
Community (EEC) Treaty that brought environmental protection
within the EEC's jurisdiction enables non-government organisations
to initiate proceedings against the community before the European
118. An example at the international level of such a legal instrument is the CONVENTION ON
ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENTS IN A TRANS-BOUNDARY CONTEXT, Feb. 25, 1991,
XXVII.4 ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT IN A TRANSBOUNDARY CONTEXT. This lists the
activities to be included within the convention, acquires cooperative assessment of the possible
or likely extraterritorial impact and mandates post project analysis; public participation at all of
these stages is legally ensured, and on an equal footing with the nations state. Id.
119. The Bergen Declaration emphasised: "[T]he importance of participation by a well-in-
formed and a well-educated society so as to allow the public to mobilise itself ... and to en-
courage open debate on the environmental implications of national policies." Bergen
Declaration, supra note 117, at paras. 16, 16(e).
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Court of Justice.120 Nongovernment organisations may inform the
EEC Commission of breaches by individual member states of commu-
nity environmental laws and have standing to intervene before the
European Court in environmental issues. Indeed, it was after the ac-
tive lobbying by Friends of the Earth, that the Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities initiated an investigation into the proposed
privatisation of the water industry in Britain. The result of this inves-
tigation was a warning to Britain by the EEC Environment Commis-
sioner that Britain must meet the minimum EEC standards or face
legal action. Greenpeace Luxembourg helped a French group to ap-
ply to the European Court of Justice for an order to shut down a
French nuclear power plant because of the plant's failure to comply
with an EEC procedural requirement.
Environmental issues do not fit easily into a geographic frame-
work of region and nation state. Environmental problems have no
respect for regional boundaries or traditional notions of sovereignty,
territory and state. Environmental risk procedures must be dynamic if
they are to quickly adapt to changed circumstances, such as new scien-
tific evidence and public perceptions of risk. This reinforces the ideal
of community as a horizontal and cooperative sharing of information.
The challenge for law is to provide a procedural framework
within which environmental cooperation can take place. It is funda-
mental to this cooperative approach that law continues to expand its
definition of legal persons. Procedural obligations underlying practi-
cal applications of precaution and community will require agreements
(even if it is temporary agreement) concerning specific sectoral ap-
proaches, specific substances, information exchange, and some kind of
compliance control by means of a reporting data network. Informa-
tion exchange must include transfers of technology. Because evalua-
tive standards must, to a large extent, depend upon scientific evidence
and public opinion, those standards must be able to adapt themselves
quickly to scientific and technological evolution and therefore be
much more flexible than traditional legal mechanisms. The interde-
pendence of local, regional, and national groups emphasises the need
120. The Single European Act, Feb. 16, 1986, European Economic Community, pt. 3, tit. VII,
art. 130R, 298 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter EEC Treaty]. Article 130 of the amended EEC Treaty
now provides that the EEC has the following environmental objectives: "preserve, protect and
improve the quality of the environment; to contribute towards protecting human health; [and] to
ensure a prudent and rational utilization of natural resources." Id. at 2680.
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to attain the broadest possible membership in the agreement-making,
standard setting and information exchange. 121
Institutionalising precaution canvasses the limits of undertaking
environmentally harmful activities and cooperation between
neighbouring groups in situations of environmental risk and also in-
stances of environmental damage. The need for communication on
sustainable use of resources between neighbouring groups becomes
evermore evident when the transboundary environmental effects of
resource use are fully appreciated. 122 Because the possibility of envi-
ronmental damage exists at all times, it is not only important to set a
low threshold of sustainability of environmental interference and sim-
ple procedures to determine causation and responsibility of and for
environmental damage, but it is also essential to continually reenforce
the idea of reciprocity. That is, neighbouring groups need to commu-
nicate about environmental interferences. They may mandate that a
group or nation-state refrain from a particular activity if environmen-
tal injury is certain or imminent, or if there is no known method of
subsumption of the hazard known. It is precisely when a situation of
environmental hazard is evident-be it of low probability, but of po-
tentially high risk of environmental damage through its unknown ex-
tent of consequences-that the communicative impulse to neighbours
must be ensured.
Environmental precaution where consequential damage is not yet
fully known or quantifiable must remain a vague notion. Therefore,
not only must the legal articulation of precaution set out the principle,
but it must also set out evaluative standards that are subject to fre-
quent review. Underlying these communicative procedures about risk
and the potential for accident lies a cooperative understanding of
standards. 123 General rules to reduce and minimise environmental in-
terference are only likely to be actualised if they are considered practi-
cally feasible. For example, where transboundary effects constitute a
mere possibility, this needs to invoke a legal obligation of information
121. Innovative approaches in international convention procedures seek to give a voice to
those groups who have not been heard with the same force as other, more powerful voices and
provide a model for regional mechanisms. These approaches have included weighted voting of
groups (which have altered the entry into force of environmental standards for particular groups
and adjustments peculiar to their regional circumstances), nonequality of parties, so as to pro-
vide a special regime for developing countries, and compliance sanctions, such as trade restric-
tions, affecting noncomplying parties.
122. For example, upstream use of water resources effects on downstream users and air pol-
lution that has immediate trans-boundary effects.
123. For an analysis of different critical perspectives on standards and judgement, see Peter
D. Swan, Critical Legal Theory and the Politics of Pragmatism, 12 DALHOUME L. J. 349 (1989).
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to, and consultation with, transboundary neighbours. The legal role is
to underscore this communicative cooperation with a de facto compul-
sion of the duty to inform, consult, and coordinate. Effective in-
tercommunity and interstate communication on precaution and risk
requires a reliable procedural framework. Processes may stipulate a
description of the factual situation surrounding the environmental
risk, the perception of competence of the risk generator to deal with
that risk, and an assessment of the known and acknowledgment of un-
known environmental effects. Procedures need to cover situations of
intended as well as unintended environmental consequences and
accidents.
CONCLUSION
As the temporal imperatives of environmental degradation be-
come starker, it is likely that international, national, and regional envi-
ronmental policy will increasingly internalise the message of the
Brundtland Report. Recognition of environmental and ecological in-
terdependence emphasises the idea of collective interests, but need
not blur real differences in the capacity of regions to respond to eco-
logical problems. Conservation biology is recognising ongoing change
as the likeliest constant in the natural world. The very idea of "equi-
librium" is being reviewed. Indeed, it seems more likely that our
yearning for stasis in the social world has been projected onto the nat-
ural world. The insights of newer ecological theories can be turned
back onto the social world. This shows us that our yearning for fixity
is possibility more than a desire than a reality. Intense regulation of
the environment may be emotionally satisfying and of intellectual
comfort, but it is unlikely to be relevant to the natural circumstances
that continually alter.124
The potential for reform of political, legal, and social institutions
through ecological values remains. The danger in becoming part of
orthodox discourse is that environmentalism may thereby become in-
stitutionalised and frozen in that process. That is why there needs to
be a greater focus upon how the processes of institutions need to be
altered. There is a saying that "the revolution eats its children." Ecol-
ogy must be as conscious of the voices that oppose it, or it will replace
one form of intellectual arrogance for another. The next phase needs
to address how society is to make the transition to ecologically sensi-
124. Brundtland Report, supra note 2, at 7.
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tive decision making, and consider the role of institutions within that
transition.
Law has been part of the search for new theoretical insights to its
normative structure. In this way, it has belatedly reflected the self-
examination that took place earlier in the social sciences, economics
and ecology as part of a wider questioning of scientific formalism.125
In questioning the contingency of all legal action, critique in law has
caused a backlash of claims to objectivity and rational standards that
are present, though not necessarily obvious.' 26 The application of
contemporary forms of critique to law has led to accusations that
throwing out the idea of fixed ideals and standards, measurable
against an Archimedian point, can lead us to no good. Such funda-
mental questioning leaves us with nothing against which to judge our
actions and aspirations, it is said, so the very idea of ethics and moral-
ity loses its potency.' 27
Environmentalism within the dominant ideologies that guide
legal action makes much mileage from the imperative of "coherence"
in policy. "Coherence," after all, is "rational." Despite its anchoring
to ideological rationality, law is increasingly drifting from its "fixed"
moorings in response to ecological imperatives. Although govern-
ments are guided by the meta-narratives to be platonic and to apply
policy solutions arrived at deductively, both international and Austra-
lian environmental policy has already become ideologically "impure."
Institutions struggle with ecological problems that defy easy bracket-
ing into sub-groups of anatomical likeness. The struggle to categorise
frequently overtakes the environmental dimension.
Environmentalism as an ethical gesture cannot escape the attack
against foundational concepts and the constituting character of
human-centred legal language. The postmaterialism and environ-
mentalism of the 1970s and 1980s sought to resist the dominant dis-
courses, but did so within the same paradigm of power and authority
as the meta-narratives. The pre-ideological essences of "natural" and
"wild(erness)" replaced those of "atomistic individual" and "rational-
ity." Environmental concern was often accompanied by a view of na-
ture as a benign, closed system. Social life seeks to replicate this
vision of nature. Nature's natural harmony was to provide a guide to
125. Swan, supra note 123.
126. Ronald Dworkin, for instance, has placed "good" judging within the unspoken but pres-
ent practices of society. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
127. For a discussion of the disruption to traditional legal approaches that is perceived by
those who are suspicious of contemporary legal critique, see Hunt, supra note 93.
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social life. "Nature," "balance," and "healthy" become metaphors for
one another. Living according to ecological principles was seen as the
cure to the exploitation of nature that had been perpetuated through
the principles of economy.
Environmental sensibilities within this form of naive communitar-
ianism would have nature's foundations replace economy's founda-
tions on the assumption that nature represents a mystical, non-violent
innocence. Nature's natural harmony became the new authentic
model for organising human relations. This approach has merely
adopted and reversed the old patterns of domination. It has posited
another "natural" in relation to a false reality by creating a new uni-
versal truth. This truth then guides the (platonic) constraints of
human action. It remains fixed with the idea of a supreme value.
Events are measured by reference to this stable ideal. Something that
fails to reflect the absolute is not the absolute. It remains foundation-
alist, it holds up a new essence to replace the old. My point is that it is
just as unlikely to hold the whole solution as what it seeks to replace,
because the "whole" has never been glimpsed.
An alternative understanding that there is no one "knowledge"
need not become another totalising theory or stable body of thought,
but clears the space for any thoughts that may be considered once
"knowledge" is no longer the standard of a "thought."'1 28 To surren-
der to a new space of community as an ethic of dialogue is an act of
hope. For some environmentalists, it may mean opening up space for
those who have previously behaved downright destructively towards
the environment. No doubt, it would feel as though the political and
128. Poststructuralism employs deconstruction as a corrosive method to undo binary opposi-
tions and clear the ground for that which is unthought as yet-that which has not yet been
considered an idea. Deconstruction of ideological premises points out the "Truths" that have
been forced upon society, and suggests that it is only the authority of power that has given any
sense of that structure appearing "natural" to the rest of society. Deconstruction shows up the
particular segment of society that the "Truth" served, and points out that its selection as a
"Truth" is an arbitrary selection. "Truth" retrospectively authorises the structure and hierarchy
of society in privileged group(s), see Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of
the Human Sciences, in THE LANGUAGE OF CRITICISM AND THE SCIENCES OF MAN 247 (Richard
Macksey & Eugenio Donato eds., 1970). Deconstruction has no inherent political agenda, but
clears the space for multiple possibilities of political action. See DOMINICK LA CAPRA, SOUND-
INGS IN CRITICAL THEORY (1989). The method of deconstruction intersects with politics, be-
cause it challenges the hierarchical command structure of society, which in turn has legitimated a
point of authority (monarch, religious figure or parliament), police forces to enforce the com-
mand structure and cultural and sexual oppression. The philosophy becomes the tool of politics
through its capacity to bias organisation and impose domination. "Deconstruction posits that
the pressing for certainty and power is the history of Western metaphysics .... Abdicating a
belief in progress towards truth, deconstruction finds knowledge to be a thinly veiled will to-
wards mastery." Peter Quigley, Rethinking Resistance: Environmentalism, Literature, and Post-
structural Theory, 14 ENvrt.. ETHICS 291, 295 (1992).
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legal struggle of the last twenty-five years was at risk, with only the
hope to sustain them that opening up the site of social struggle will
bring its own reward. For the incrementalists (and this would include
most lawyers), this may mean placing less reliance upon carefully
measured and intensive environmental policy and regulatory re-
sponses, such as the creeping application of the public trust doctrine.
For everyone, it means formulating "community" not on the basis of
what it all too frequently is, but on what it could be.
